





This week

 **The most important event this week will be the ECB meeting scheduled for Thursday.** We expect the ECB to cut interest rates by 25bp, bringing the main rate to 3.15% and the deposit rate to 3.00%. We are of the opinion that during the press conference after the meeting, ECB president Ch. Lagarde will signal a perspective of further monetary policy easing in the coming months. In our view, the ECB's September projections proved to be relatively accurate and we therefore do not expect significant revisions in the December projection. Our expectations for interest rate evolution in 2025 remain more hawkish than the current market pricing, which is due to the fact that we do not expect a significant economic slowdown in the Eurozone, which would justify a very easing monetary policy. Hence, we forecast that in 2025, the ECB will make three rate cuts of 25bp each (in January, March and April), bringing rates down to a target of 2.40% for the main rate and 2.25% for the deposit rate. Our forecast of a 25bp interest rate cut this week is in line with the market consensus, so its materialisation will be neutral for the zloty exchange rate and the yields on Polish bonds.




 **This week we will get to know data from the US.** In our view, CPI inflation increased to 2.7% YoY in November, up from 2.6% in October, while core inflation remained at 3.3% for the third consecutive month. The data will therefore signal continued inflationary pressures in the US. Higher food and fuel price growth rates were the main drivers of higher headline inflation. In our view, the publication of US inflation data will be neutral for financial markets.

 **China's foreign trade data will be published on Tuesday.** We expect the trade balance to have declined to USD 86.2bn in November against USD 95.7bn in October. We forecast that China's import growth increased to 1.5% YoY vs. -2.3% in October, confirming the improvement in domestic demand observed in the manufacturing



survey results (see MACROmap of 02.12.2024). For exports, on the other hand, we expect a slowdown in growth to 7.0% YoY, compared to 12.7% in October, driven by a decline in demand from South Korea and the effect of a high base from a year ago. The published data will be the first showing the effects of the late October tariff hike on Chinese electric cars in the European Union. It should be noted that China's exports continue to be supported by an increased flow of orders related to the expected tariff hikes in the US in the coming months (see MACROmap of 04.11.2024). In our view, the data from China will be neutral for financial markets.

 **Data from the German economy will be published this week.** According to market consensus, the trade balance fell to EUR 15.8bn in October, compared to EUR 17.0bn in September. The annual export growth had already been below zero for five months and was likely to remain negative in October as well. On the other hand, the growth of imports, supported by the effects of the low base from a year ago, has been on a slight upward trend in recent months. Hence, the data will confirm the continuing unfavourable situation in the German industry (see below). We are of the opinion that the data from Germany will be neutral for financial markets.

- **On Friday, the final data on inflation in Poland will be published.** We expect inflation to have been in line with the preliminary estimate of GUS and to have reached 4.6% YoY in November, compared to 5.0% in October. According to the preliminary data, the decline in the headline inflation was mainly due to lower fuel price growth, which, according to the preliminary estimate, decreased in November to -6.0% YoY against 0.0% in October, which was due to the high base effect from a year ago. In our view, the final inflation data will be neutral for the zloty exchange rate and the yields on Polish bonds.
- **On Friday we will also see the data on the Polish balance of payments.** We forecast that the current account will show a surplus of EUR 75m in October, compared to a deficit of EUR 1434m in September. We forecast that exports growth increased to 1.9% YoY in October vs. 0.5% in September, and imports growth to 6.3% vs. 5.1%, which was largely driven by favourable calendar effects. We also expect that a significant improvement in the primary income balance also contributed to the generation of the current account surplus. In our view, the balance of payments data will be neutral for the zloty exchange rate and the yields on Polish bonds.


Last week

- **Last week, the Monetary Policy Council decided to keep interest rates unchanged (with the NBP reference rate standing at 5.75%).** The MPC's decision was consistent with the market consensus and our forecast. The Council reiterated its assessment that demand and cost pressures in the Polish economy remain relatively low, which amidst weakened economic conditions and lower inflation pressure abroad curbs domestic inflation pressures. The Council has again cited marked growth in energy prices and wages, as well as regulatory changes as factors driving inflationary pressures up. The Council also pointed out that in the coming quarters inflation would remain markedly above the NBP inflation target driven by the effects of the earlier increase in energy prices, as well as planned increases in excise duties and administered services prices, signalling a shift in its inflation outlook compared to November (see MACROPulse of 04/12/2024). The Council also reiterated its opinion regarding the future level of interest rates, which will depend on incoming information regarding prospects for inflation and economic activity. During the usual press conference, NBP Governor A. Głapiński noted that due to the government's decision regarding the partial freeze on energy prices in 2025, inflation in H2 would rise above the path from the November projection. In his opinion, this will delay the start of discussions on monetary policy easing from March 2025 to October 2025, meaning the first interest rate cut might not occur until 2026. The wording of the press release published after the MPC meeting and comments made by the NBP Governor are consistent with our scenario of interest rate stabilisation in the quarters to come. At the same time, we stand by our forecast that the first rate cut (by 25bp) will be introduced in Q3.
- **The PMI index for the Polish manufacturing sector fell to 48.9 pts in November from 49.2 pts in October, below market expectations (49.0 pts) and above our forecast (48.5 pts).** As a result, the index has now remained below the 50-pts boundary separating growth from decline in activity for 31 months. The decline in the index was due to lower contributions from 3 out of its 5 components (for output, inventories and new orders), while the opposite impact was due to lower contributions from the components for employment and delivery times. According to the report, an important reason for the decline in the manufacturing activity was the reduced inflow of export orders. Companies surveyed reported concerns about a weakening European demand, especially from Germany. With the slower inflow of new orders, despite the completion of the production backlog, the output declined in November. It is noteworthy that in the last 31 months, the component of output has been above the 50-pts mark only once - in October this year. This signals that the strong increase in the seasonally adjusted industrial production (by 4.6% MoM), which was noted by GUS in October, was most likely a one-off (see MACROPulse of 02/12/2024).

This assessment is also supported by the index for the expected production over a 12-month horizon. Although it remains above the 50-pts limit, it recorded a strong decline in November and reached its lowest value since December 2022. The PMI was clearly above its average value in Q3 (49.0 pts vs. 47.9 pts) in October-November. However, this does not change our scenario of a slight slowdown in the economic growth in Q4 (to 2.5% YoY vs. 2.7% in Q3).

Last week we got to know important data from the German economy.


Industrial production declined by 1.0% MoM in October, compared with a 2.0% decline in September (upward revision from -2.5%), coming in significantly below market expectations (up by 1.1%). A reduction in industrial production growth was recorded in the energy sector, while production growth in manufacturing and construction increased.



The strongest decline in production was in the categories “manufacture of tobacco products” (-12.8% MoM), “manufacture and supply of electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning systems” (-10.2%) and “manufacture and processing of coke and refined petroleum products” (-8.9%). Production in energy-intensive industries also declined in October (by 0.6% MoM), which is now around 17% lower than immediately before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. The decrease in production in energy-intensive industries was influenced by the decrease in production in the petrochemical and coke industry mentioned above as well as in the chemical industry. Last week, we also saw data on orders in manufacturing, whose monthly growth rate decreased in October to -1.5% compared with 7.2% in September (upward revision from 4.2%), coming in above market expectations (-2.0%). The decline in new orders growth was driven by lower domestic orders growth, while higher export orders growth had the opposite effect. The increase in export orders was driven by higher orders from countries outside the Eurozone, while orders from the common currency area decreased. On a sectoral basis, the strongest decline in new orders was recorded in the categories “manufacture of machinery and equipment” (the lowest level since July 2020) and “other transport equipment” (it is worth bearing in mind, however, that orders in this category are characterised by high volatility). Given the incoming business survey results, we notice a slight downside risk to our forecast that Germany's quarterly GDP growth will increase to 0.2% in Q4, compared to 0.1% in Q3, and for the whole of 2024, the German GDP will increase by 0.1%, compared to a decline of 0.3% in 2023.

According to the final estimate, quarterly GDP growth in the Eurozone increased to 0.4% in Q3, up from 0.2% in Q2 2024, in line with the second estimate.

On an annual basis, the GDP in the Eurozone increased by 0.9% YoY in Q3, compared with 0.6% in Q2. The increase in the quarterly GDP growth



in the Eurozone was due to higher contributions from investment, private consumption and inventories, while the opposite impact was due to lower contributions from government spending and net exports. Hence, the main sources of economic growth in Q3 in the Eurozone were investments, private consumption and inventories (equal contributions to the GDP growth), while in Q2 these were private consumption and net exports. Given the incoming business survey results, we see a slight downside risk to our forecast that quarterly GDP growth in the Eurozone

will slow down to 0.3% in Q4. At the same time, we forecast that for the whole of 2024, the GDP in the common currency area will increase by 0.8% YoY, compared to the growth of 0.4% in 2023.

✓ **Some significant data on the US economy was released last week.** Non-farm payrolls rose by 227k in November vs. 36k in October (upward revision from 12k), markedly exceeding market expectations (an increase of 190k) and our forecast (an increase of 240k). The strong job growth in November reflected the fading impact of strikes and hurricanes that had constrained employment in previous months. The largest gains in employment were seen in education and health services (+79.0k), leisure and hospitality (+53.0k), and the government sector (+33.0k). On the other hand, a significant decline in employment was only reported in retail trade (-28.0k). Unemployment rose to 4.2% in November from 4.1% in October, aligning with both market expectations and our forecast. Thus, the unemployment rate in the US has remained slightly above the natural rate of unemployment, estimated by the Fed at 4.0%, for six months running. The labour force participation rate dropped to 62.5% in November from 62.6% in October, thus remaining below the pre-COVID level (63.3%). Hourly wage growth held steady at 4.0% YoY in November, having remained unchanged relative to October, which, in our opinion, suggests that wage pressures in the US economy remain elevated. The ISM manufacturing index rose to 48.4 pts in November from 46.5 pts in October, surpassing market expectations which were consistent with our forecast (47.5 pts). The index grew on the back of higher contributions of 4 out of its 5 sub-indices (current output, employment, new orders and inventories), with a lower contribution of the delivery times sub-index having the opposite effect. Notably, while the current output sub-index has remained below the 50-point threshold for six months, the new orders sub-index surpassed this level for the first time since March, suggesting a potential rebound in manufacturing activity in the coming months. Additionally, the decline in inventories slowed down markedly compared to recent months, suggesting some businesses are increasing orders for intermediate goods from China in anticipation of the higher tariffs announced by the Trump administration. In contrast, the ISM services index dropped to 52.1 pts in November from 56.0 pts in October, performing significantly below market expectations (55.6 pts) and our forecast (55.5 pts). The drop in the index is accounted for by lower contributions from all of its 4 sub-indices (employment, business activity, new orders, and delivery times). Thus, in November, the differences between the manufacturing and services sectors in terms of the assessment of the situation became wider. Last week, the preliminary University of Michigan index was published, showing an increase to 74.0 pts in December vs. 71.8 pts in November, printing above market expectations (73.1 pts) and below our forecast (75.0 pts). The rise in the index was driven by a higher current situation sub-index, partially offset by a lower expectations sub-index. The median for the expected inflation over a one-year horizon, released together with the University of Michigan index, rose to 2.9% in December from 2.6% in November, which shows that US households' inflation expectations remain elevated. Recent US economic data releases point to a gradual slowdown in economic activity, supporting our forecast that the Fed will lower interest rates by 25bp at its December meeting (see MACROmap of 02/12/2024).

✓ **We have revised our mid-term EURUSD forecast.** We now expect the USD to be stronger in 2025 than we previously anticipated due to projected tariff hikes and the D. Trump's administration's fiscal loosening, which we believe will lead to a smaller scale of monetary easing by the Fed. Consequently, we expect the EURUSD exchange rate to fall to 1.04 by the end of June 2025. Over the longer term, we anticipate a gradual weakening of the USD relative to the EUR, reaching 1.07 and 1.10 by the end of 2025 and 2026, respectively. Our forecast accounts for the risk associated with the weakening of the USD attributable to the D. Trump administration adopting the "weak dollar" policy to support US international trade. Considering our EURPLN forecast, we expect the USDPLN exchange rate to reach 3.97 at the end of 2025 and 3.83 at the end of 2026.

Central and Eastern Europe resilient to US tariff hikes

In the MACROmap of 25/11/2024, we presented the channels through which reduced demand from the US could impact Poland's exports and economic growth in the event of intensified US protectionist measures. Below we outline our summary macroeconomic scenario for the remaining countries of the CE region – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania (hereafter: CE-4 countries).

| | Share of exports to the US in total goods exports | Share of goods exports to the US in GDP |
|----------------|---|---|
| Czech Republic | 2,4% | 1,8% |
| Hungary | 2,9% | 2,2% |
| Romania | 2,3% | 0,7% |
| Poland | 3,1% | 1,5% |

Source: Eurostat, Credit Agricole, data for 2023

Reduced US demand affects the exports of CE-4 countries through two main channels. The first is the direct trade between Poland and the US, while the second is the indirect negative impact of tariff hikes manifested through reduced demand from economies for which CE-4 countries are a supplier (e.g. Germany). Similarly to Poland, the US

share in the foreign trade of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania is small and does not exceed 3%. As with Poland, their exports to the US are concentrated in a few key sectors ("nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof", "electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof"; "sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles"; "optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof"). Additionally, Hungary's exports also feature a significant share of "vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof," while Romania's exports show a notable presence of "rubber and articles thereof", "articles of iron or steel", and "iron and steel".

A factor differentiating the degree of exposure of CE-4 economies to reduced US demand is the share of exports in their GDP. In Hungary and the Czech Republic, it is much higher than in Poland, exacerbating the impact of a decline in foreign demand on economic growth. Exports to the US in relation to GDP stand at 2.2% for Hungary, 1.8% for the Czech Republic and 1.5% for Poland. Romania is the least sensitive to a US demand shock as it has the lowest share of goods exports in GDP, resulting also in the lowest ratio of exports to the US relative to GDP (0.7%, see table). Thus, we expect that the negative impact of a potential tariff increase would be concentrated in the industries mentioned above and that its consequences would be stronger for Hungary and the Czech Republic than for Poland and Romania.

In the context of D. Trump's changes in foreign policy, a question arises about the extent to which decreased exports from other European countries to the US will affect CE-4 manufacturing activity, which serves as an important supplier of semi-finished products and components (i.e. intermediate goods) for them. In order to estimate this impact on the economies of the countries under analysis, we used the input-output table developed by the OECD, as we did in the analysis published in the MACROmap of 25/11/2024. We assumed a 10% drop in US imports across all manufacturing categories in all EU countries except the country under analysis. This assumption facilitates the later rescaling of the negative effects of the shock depending on different tariff hike scenarios and the associated US demand decrease. In the case of the remaining categories (services, mining and construction), we assumed no changes in US demand. Our analysis considers the decline in demand for both intermediate goods and final products delivered to the US.


| Impact of 10% drop in US demand on | GDP | Production in manufacturing |
|------------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------|
| Czech Republic | -0,05% | -0,11% |
| Hungary | -0,04% | -0,10% |
| Romania | -0,03% | -0,07% |
| Poland | -0,04% | -0,08% |

Source: Credit Agricole

Relating the value of intermediate goods exported from CE-4 countries for the needs of the remaining EU member states to the production of individual sectors of those countries' manufacturing, we estimate that a 10% decrease in US demand would contribute to a reduction in

manufacturing of about 0.11% in the Czech Republic, 0.10% in Hungary, 0.08% in Poland and 0.07% in Romania. It should be noted that these estimates include direct effects, which represent the direct impact of the decline in production in EU countries on the activity of industries that are their direct suppliers of components and semi-finished products, as well as indirect effects. By indirect effects, we mean a decline in production in businesses that supply intermediate goods to other Polish companies that are direct suppliers to businesses in the EU (both domestic and foreign). Due to the extensive network of (often international) ties, indirect effects may materialize with some delay. Sector-wise, in each of the analysed countries, a 10% decrease in US demand leads to a reduction in manufacturing that is most substantially manifested in the "basic metals" category. The most affected sectors in each of the CE-4 are also "rubber and plastics products", "chemicals and chemical products" and "motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers". For Poland and Romania, "electrical equipment" also ranks among the top affected sectors, whereas for the Czech Republic and Hungary, it is "fabricated metal products" (see chart).

Effects of a 10% drop in demand from the U.S. on production in selected industries of CEE countries



* The charts show the 5 industries of each country where we expect the largest decline in production
Source: Credit Agricole

The calculations presented above indicate that a potential decrease in US demand would have a limited impact on activity in CE-4 manufacturing and would be concentrated in a small number of industries. Consequently, it does not pose a substantial risk to the economic recovery we expect in each of these four countries. Even if we assumed that the drop in exports from the EU to the US would be much higher (e.g. 30%), its effects on production and GDP in CE-4 countries would still be small.

| | Direct impact | Indirect impact | Total impact |
|-----------------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Czech Republic | -0,09% | -0,04% | -0,13% |
| Hungary | -0,08% | -0,03% | -0,11% |
| Romania | -0,05% | -0,03% | -0,08% |
| Poland | -0,07% | -0,03% | -0,10% |

Source: Credit Agricole

In parallel, we analysed an alternative demand shock limited only to the automotive industry. For this purpose, we assumed that exports in the “vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers” categories from all EU countries (excluding the country under analysis) to the US would decrease by 10%. At the same time, US demand for production in other industries would not change. In such a scenario were to materialise, the impact on the automotive sectors on the individual CE-4 countries would be small, never exceeding a total decrease of 0.13%. If such a scenario were to materialise, the impact on the automotive industry in the sector, which is tied to European car manufacturers, would thus be negligible. We estimate that the impact of reduced demand attributable to a decrease in the automotive sector demand would range from a total decline of 0.08% in Romania, to 0.10% in Poland, 0.11% in Hungary, and 0.13% in the Czech Republic (see table).

| | Real GDP (% YoY) | | | CPI (% YoY) | | |
|-------------------|------------------|------|------|-------------|------|------|
| | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
| Czech Rep. | 1,0 | 2,6 | 2,4 | 2,5 | 2,2 | 2,0 |
| Hungary | 0,7 | 2,9 | 3,1 | 3,6 | 3,7 | 3,0 |
| Romania | 1,1 | 3,5 | 2,9 | 5,6 | 3,9 | 3,3 |
| Poland | 2,6 | 3,5 | 3,3 | 3,7 | 4,4 | 3,1 |

Source: Credit Agricole

In summary, we expect that increased protectionist tendencies will have a limited impact on the economies of the CE-4 region in 2025 and will not derail the strong economic growth recovery we are forecasting for these countries. In 2026, we expect the economic situation to stabilise across


all CE-4 economies, with GDP growth slowing down slightly due to high base effects from 2025, though still remaining at a relatively high level. Public investment growth will remain elevated due to continued robust absorption of EU funds. Economic growth will also be supported by improving foreign demand and strong consumption. Meanwhile, we expect the downward trend in inflation to continue. In H2 2026, inflation will be close to central banks’ inflation targets in all the CE-4 countries. In our opinion, if the macroeconomic scenario outlined above materialises, national central banks will continue gradually easing their monetary policies and local currencies will gradually strengthen against the EUR (see table). We believe that the HUF will appreciate more than the other regional currencies, mainly due to anticipated political changes in that country. Recent polls suggest that the support for the opposition candidate P. Magyar is higher than for V. Orban. We believe that the opposition will win the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2026, thereby reducing Hungary's risk premium (for example, by increasing the likelihood of unlocking EU funds) and strengthening the HUF in 2026 (see table).

| | Central banks' base rates (%) | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|-------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--|
| | Dec.24 | Mar.25 | Jun.25 | Sep.25 | Dec.25 | Mar.26 | Jun.26 | Sep.26 | Dec.26 | |
| Czech Rep. | 3,75 | 3,25 | 3,00 | 3,00 | 3,00 | 3,00 | 3,00 | 3,00 | 3,00 | |
| Hungary | 6,50 | 6,25 | 6,00 | 5,75 | 5,50 | 5,25 | 5,00 | 4,75 | 4,50 | |
| Romania | 6,50 | 6,25 | 6,00 | 5,75 | 5,50 | 5,25 | 5,00 | 4,75 | 4,50 | |
| Poland | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,50 | 5,25 | 5,00 | 4,75 | 4,50 | 4,25 | |

| | FX rates | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--|
| | Dec.24 | Mar.25 | Jun.25 | Sep.25 | Dec.25 | Mar.26 | Jun.26 | Sep.26 | Dec.26 | |
| EURCZK | 25,4 | 25,8 | 25,5 | 25,1 | 24,7 | 24,6 | 24,5 | 24,4 | 24,3 | |
| EURHUF | 410 | 415 | 410 | 397 | 385 | 380 | 370 | 369 | 365 | |
| EURRON | 4,98 | 4,98 | 4,97 | 4,97 | 4,97 | 4,97 | 4,97 | 4,97 | 4,97 | |
| EURPLN | 4,35 | 4,40 | 4,35 | 4,30 | 4,25 | 4,24 | 4,23 | 4,22 | 4,21 | |

Source: Datastream, Credit Agricole


EURPLN exchange rate remains in downward trend



Last week, the EURPLN rate dropped to 4.2637 (strengthening of the PLN by 0.8%). Throughout last week, the EURPLN followed a mild downward trend, following the EUR’s appreciation against the USD. An additional factor supporting the PLN was the hawkish tone of NBP Governor A. Glapiński’s Thursday press conference.

We believe that other publications from the Polish and global economies planned for this week will have a limited impact on the PLN. Further developments in the Middle East and Ukraine will remain a key factor for the PLN. Should geopolitical risk escalate, this may drive the EURPLN rate up.

NBP Governor’s press conference triggers IRS rate increase



Last week, 2-year IRS rose increased to 5.05 (up by 23bp), 5-year rates to 4.67 (up by 20bp) and 10-year ones to 4.77 (up by 15bp). IRS rates went markedly up last week across the entire length of the curve in response to the hawkish tone of the NBP Governor A. Glapiński’s press conference (see above). Meanwhile, yields in core markets remained relatively stable, leading to an increased spread between Polish and German bonds.

In our opinion, other data releases from the Polish and global economies scheduled for this week will be neutral for IRS rates. However, further developments in the Middle East and Ukraine will remain a key factor for the curve. Should geopolitical risk escalate, this may drive IRS rates up.

Forecasts of the monthly macroeconomic indicators

| Main monthly macroeconomic indicators in Poland | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Indicator | Nov-23 | Dec-23 | Jan-24 | Feb-24 | Mar-24 | Apr-24 | May-24 | Jun-24 | Jul-24 | Aug-24 | Sep-24 | Oct-24 | Nov-24 | Dec-24 |
| NBP reference rate (%) | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,75 |
| EURPLN* | 4,35 | 4,33 | 4,32 | 4,31 | 4,29 | 4,33 | 4,27 | 4,30 | 4,29 | 4,28 | 4,28 | 4,35 | 4,30 | 4,35 |
| USDPLN* | 4,00 | 3,93 | 4,00 | 3,99 | 3,97 | 4,06 | 3,94 | 4,02 | 3,96 | 3,87 | 3,85 | 4,00 | 4,06 | 4,10 |
| CHFPLN* | 4,56 | 4,64 | 4,64 | 4,52 | 4,40 | 4,41 | 4,36 | 4,47 | 4,50 | 4,56 | 4,54 | 4,64 | 4,60 | 4,63 |
| CPI inflation (% YoY) | 6,6 | 6,2 | 3,7 | 2,8 | 2,0 | 2,4 | 2,5 | 2,6 | 4,2 | 4,3 | 4,9 | 5,0 | 4,6 | 4,6 |
| Core inflation (% YoY) | 7,3 | 6,9 | 6,2 | 5,4 | 4,6 | 4,1 | 3,8 | 3,6 | 3,8 | 3,7 | 4,3 | 4,1 | 4,2 | 4,2 |
| Industrial production (% YoY) | -0,3 | -3,5 | 3,0 | 3,2 | -5,7 | 7,8 | -1,6 | 0,0 | 5,3 | -1,3 | -0,5 | 4,7 | -2,0 | -2,0 |
| PPI inflation (% YoY) | -5,1 | -6,9 | -10,6 | -10,0 | -9,9 | -8,5 | -7,0 | -5,8 | -5,1 | -5,5 | -6,2 | -5,2 | -3,9 | -3,9 |
| Retail sales (% YoY) | 2,6 | 0,5 | 4,6 | 6,7 | 6,0 | 4,3 | 5,4 | 4,7 | 5,0 | 3,2 | -2,2 | 2,3 | 1,0 | 1,0 |
| Corporate sector wages (% YoY) | 11,8 | 9,6 | 12,8 | 12,9 | 12,0 | 11,3 | 11,4 | 11,0 | 10,6 | 11,1 | 10,3 | 10,2 | 10,2 | 10,2 |
| Employment (% YoY) | -0,2 | -0,1 | -0,2 | -0,2 | -0,2 | -0,4 | -0,5 | -0,4 | -0,4 | -0,5 | -0,5 | -0,5 | -0,6 | -0,6 |
| Unemployment rate* (%) | 5,0 | 5,1 | 5,4 | 5,4 | 5,3 | 5,1 | 5,0 | 4,9 | 5,0 | 5,0 | 5,0 | 4,9 | 4,9 | 4,9 |
| Current account (M EUR) | 1182 | -102 | 1575 | 1752 | 1239 | 623 | -451 | 485 | -1116 | -2731 | -1434 | 75 | 75 | 75 |
| Exports (% YoY EUR) | -2,0 | -6,3 | -3,1 | 2,0 | -8,7 | 7,5 | -6,0 | -7,3 | 4,7 | -3,3 | 0,5 | 1,9 | 1,9 | 1,9 |
| Imports (% YoY EUR) | -6,1 | -9,3 | -4,1 | 2,1 | -7,2 | 4,7 | 0,1 | 0,6 | 9,1 | 4,9 | 5,1 | 6,3 | 6,3 | 6,3 |

*end of period

Forecasts of the quarterly macroeconomic indicators

| Main macroeconomic indicators in Poland | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|
| Indicator | 2024 | | | | 2025 | | | | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | |
| | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | | | | |
| Gross Domestic Product (% YoY) | 2,1 | 3,2 | 2,7 | 2,5 | 3,1 | 3,3 | 3,4 | 3,6 | 2,6 | 3,5 | 3,3 | |
| Private consumption (% YoY) | 4,4 | 4,6 | 0,3 | 2,5 | 2,5 | 2,1 | 2,0 | 1,8 | 2,9 | 2,2 | 2,9 | |
| Gross fixed capital formation (% YoY) | 1,9 | 3,2 | 0,1 | -5,8 | 5,6 | 7,7 | 8,9 | 8,8 | -1,2 | 8,1 | 7,3 | |
| Export - constant prices (% YoY) | 2,1 | 2,9 | -0,7 | 1,8 | 4,6 | 5,7 | 4,3 | 7,1 | 1,6 | 5,3 | 5,5 | |
| Import - constant prices (% YoY) | 2,3 | 5,7 | 1,9 | 3,5 | 4,9 | 5,3 | 4,3 | 3,9 | 3,3 | 4,5 | 4,6 | |
| GDP growth contributions | Private consumption (pp) | 2,7 | 2,6 | 0,2 | 1,3 | 1,5 | 1,2 | 1,2 | 0,9 | 1,7 | 1,3 | 1,7 |
| | Investments (pp) | 0,2 | 0,5 | 0,0 | -1,4 | 0,7 | 1,2 | 1,4 | 2,0 | -0,2 | 1,4 | 1,2 |
| | Net exports (pp) | 0,0 | -1,3 | -1,5 | -0,7 | 0,1 | 0,5 | 0,1 | 1,8 | -0,9 | 0,6 | 0,7 |
| Current account (% of GDP)*** | 1,6 | 1,3 | 0,4 | 1,0 | 1,0 | 0,9 | 0,8 | 0,8 | 1,0 | 0,8 | 0,1 | |
| Unemployment rate (%)** | 5,3 | 4,9 | 5,0 | 5,0 | 5,3 | 4,9 | 4,9 | 4,9 | 5,0 | 4,9 | 4,8 | |
| Non-agricultural employment (% YoY) | -0,2 | 0,9 | 1,5 | 0,5 | -0,4 | -0,5 | -0,5 | -0,5 | 0,7 | -0,5 | -0,5 | |
| Wages in national economy (% YoY) | 14,4 | 14,7 | 13,4 | 12,8 | 10,1 | 8,3 | 7,1 | 6,5 | 13,8 | 8,0 | 6,0 | |
| CPI Inflation (% YoY)* | 2,8 | 2,5 | 4,5 | 4,8 | 5,2 | 5,1 | 3,6 | 3,6 | 3,7 | 4,4 | 3,1 | |
| Wibor 3M (%)** | 5,88 | 5,85 | 5,85 | 5,85 | 5,85 | 5,60 | 5,48 | 5,35 | 5,85 | 5,35 | 4,35 | |
| NBP reference rate (%)** | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,75 | 5,50 | 5,25 | 5,75 | 5,25 | 4,25 | |
| EURPLN** | 4,29 | 4,30 | 4,28 | 4,35 | 4,40 | 4,35 | 4,30 | 4,25 | 4,35 | 4,25 | 4,21 | |
| USDPLN** | 3,97 | 4,02 | 3,85 | 4,10 | 4,19 | 4,18 | 4,10 | 3,97 | 4,10 | 3,97 | 3,83 | |

* quarterly average

** end of period

***cumulative for the last 4 quarters

Calendar

| TIME | COUNTRY | INDICATOR | PERIOD | PREV. VALUE | FORECAST* | |
|-----------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------|------------|--------------|------------|-------------|
| | | | | | CA | CONSENSUS** |
| Monday 12/09/2024 | | | | | | |
| 2:30 | China | PPI (% YoY) | Nov | -2,9 | | -2,8 |
| 2:30 | China | CPI (% YoY) | Nov | 0,3 | | 0,5 |
| 10:30 | Eurozone | Sentix Index (pts) | Dec | -12,8 | | -13,5 |
| 16:00 | USA | Wholesale inventories (% MoM) | Oct | 0,2 | | |
| 16:00 | USA | Wholesale sales (% MoM) | Oct | 0,3 | | |
| Tuesday 12/10/2024 | | | | | | |
| | China | Trade balance (bn USD) | Nov | 95,7 | 86,2 | 95,5 |
| Wednesday 12/11/2024 | | | | | | |
| 14:30 | USA | CPI (% MoM) | Nov | 0,2 | 0,3 | 0,2 |
| 14:30 | USA | Core CPI (% MoM) | Nov | 0,3 | 0,3 | 0,3 |
| Thursday 12/12/2024 | | | | | | |
| 9:30 | Switzerland | SNB rate decision (%) | Q4 | 1,00 | | |
| 14:15 | Eurozone | EBC rate decision (%) | Dec | 3,40 | 3,15 | 3,15 |
| Friday 12/13/2024 | | | | | | |
| 8:00 | Germany | Trade balance (bn EUR) | Oct | 17,0 | | 15,7 |
| 10:00 | Poland | CPI (% YoY) | Nov | 5,0 | 4,6 | 4,6 |
| 11:00 | Eurozone | Industrial production (% MoM) | Oct | -2,0 | | -0,1 |
| 14:00 | Poland | Current account (M EUR) | Oct | -1434 | 75 | -78 |

*The forecasts of macroeconomic indicators for Poland were prepared by Credit Agricole Bank Polska S.A. The forecasts of foreign indicators were prepared by Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank

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