


This week

Friday will see the release of business survey results for key Eurozone economies. The market expects a drop in the Eurozone's composite PMI to 46.3 pts in September from 46.7 pts in August. Thus, September would be the fourth month in a row with the Eurozone's composite PMI below the 50-point mark that separates growth from contraction. We believe that the drop in the PMI has been driven by a deterioration in the services sector with some improvement seen in manufacturing. Investors expect a slight rise in German manufacturing PMI, to 39.5 pts in September from 39.1 pts in August. Despite the slight rise, the index will confirm a continuing recession trend in German manufacturing. We believe that the release of Eurozone business survey results will be neutral for financial markets.

An important event this week will be a FOMC meeting planned for Wednesday. We expect the Fed to keep interest rates unchanged with the federal funds target range at [5.25%, 5.50%]. A number of FOMC members have recently softened their rhetoric slightly, noting that the risks to the prospect of inflation returning to target have become more symmetric, which makes them feel comfortable with more careful decisions. Therefore, we believe that the fall in core inflation seen in recent months (see below) as well as the first signs of a slowdown in the labour market will be sufficient arguments for FOMC to keep interest rates unchanged. Wednesday will also see the release of September projections by FOMC. We believe that the median interest rate expectations will not change significantly from the June projection, and will probably suggest one more rate hike in 2023. Nevertheless, we maintain our scenario of the Fed having already ended the rate hike cycle. However, we believe that the Fed will continue its hawkish rhetoric in the coming months, declaring readiness for further rate hikes, to prevent any premature easing in financial markets. No change to interest rates at the FOMC's September meeting would be in line with market consensus, thus we believe the decision will not have any significant impact on the prices of assets.




Source: Refinitiv, Credit Agricole

Some important data from the US will be released this week. We expect data on new building permits (1,430k in August vs. 1,443k in July), housing starts (1,430k vs. 1,452k) and existing home sales (4.09M vs. 4.07M) to show a further slowdown in the US housing market. We believe that this week's US data release will be neutral for financial markets.

Poland's industrial production figures for August will be released on Wednesday. We expect the YoY slowdown in industrial production to have decelerated to -1.7% in August from -2.7% in July. Lower pace of decline was driven by some improvement in economic activity experienced by Poland's main trading partners. Our forecast is in line with market consensus, thus its materialization will not have any significant impact on the PLN or yields on Polish bonds.

Another important event will be the release of Poland's retail sales figures scheduled for Thursday. We expect nominal growth in retail sales to have remained flat between July and August and amounted to 2.1% YoY. We believe that the factor behind the retail sales growth staying flat in August was a further improvement in consumer




Source: GUS, Credit Agricole

confidence. Our retail sales growth forecast is above market consensus (1.8%), thus, its materialization may be slightly positive for the PLN and yields on Polish bonds.

- ▬ **Data on employment and average wages in Poland’s business sector for August will be released on Wednesday.** We expect to see a slight MoM drop in employment driven primarily by continued restructuring in manufacturing. In line with this expectation, we forecast that YoY growth in employment did not change between July and August, standing at 0.1%. At the same time, we expect average wage growth to have picked up to 12.4% YoY in August from 10.4% in July, mainly as a result of the fading of last year high base effects and bonus payments in mining. We believe that the release of data on employment and average wages in the business sector will be neutral for the PLN and the debt market.
- ▬ **The release of an update on Poland’s long-term debt rating by Moody’s is scheduled for Friday.** In March, Moody’s affirmed Poland’s A2 rating with a stable outlook, but did not publish a new rating report. When explaining its decision of May 2022, Moody’s said that the rating assigned at that time was based on three factors. Firstly, Moody’s acknowledged Poland’s efforts to enhance its energy security, NATO guarantees, and the presence of NATO troops, which mitigated geopolitical risks stemming from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Secondly, the agency cited Poland’s strong economic fundamentals and still strong institutional framework, although it faced challenges from a gradually eroding rule of law. Thirdly, Moody’s acknowledged a favourable structure of Poland’s debt and low cost of debt servicing. At that time, Moody’s noted that a substantial further deterioration with respect to the rule of law, which would have a negative impact on the business climate and would lead to a further escalation of tensions between Poland and the EU, would be a factor adversely affecting Poland’s credit rating. In September, Moody’s published its comments on Poland’s draft budget for 2024. One of the comments is that the deficit shown in the draft budget, 4.5% of GDP, and a rise in the general government sector’s debt to 54% of GDP is credit negative for Poland. However, the agency expects fiscal deficit to fall below 3% in 2025, which will drive the public-debt-to-GDP ratio down. We do not expect Moody’s to change Poland’s rating or outlook this week, however, we expect the press release, if published, to emphasize the comments referred to above about rises in the fiscal deficit and public debt, and to include comments about the ongoing conflict between Poland and the EU leading to the EU withholding the funds under the EU financial perspective 2021-2027 and the National Recovery Plan. Moody’s decision will be announced after the European markets close, so we cannot expect any reaction of the FX market or the debt market to the decision before next week.


Last week

- ▬ **The European Central Bank met last week, raising its interest rates by 25bp.** The ECB’s decision was consistent with our expectations, while the consensus was that the interest rates would remain unchanged. Consequently, the ECB’s key interest rate currently stands at 4.50%, with the deposit rate reaching 4.00%. The press release after the meeting still contains the passage saying that future decisions concerning interest rates will be based on the assessment of the inflation outlook in the light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. However, the Governing Council’s conclusion was added to it, saying that *“the key ECB interest rates have reached levels that, maintained for a*




sufficiently long duration, will make a substantial contribution to the timely return of inflation to the target.” The sentence may suggest that the ECB’s interest rates are likely have reached their target level in the present monetary policy tightening cycle. Nonetheless, the ECB Chair Ch. Lagarde emphasized during the Thursday’s press conference that it cannot be said that the interest rates have reached their maximum level yet. Last week saw the release of the ECB’s new macroeconomic projections. Inflation path for 2023-2024 has been revised slightly upwards (+0.2 pp.), though it is still assumed that inflation will be back somewhere close to the inflation target in 2025. At the same time, the core inflation path has been revised slightly downwards. The GDP path, however, underwent a significant downward revision (-0.2 pp in 2023, and -0.5 pp in 2024; see the chart). The press release and the results of the September projection support our scenario in which the ECB’s interest rate hiking cycle was to come to an end in September. We expect the interest rates in the Eurozone to be cut for the first time only in Q4 2024.

 **Important data from the US was released last week.** CPI inflation went up to 3.7% YoY in August vs. 3.2% in July, running slightly above the market consensus (3.6%). Inflation rose as a result of a stronger growth in energy prices, though the opposite impact came from a slower growth in food prices and from lower core inflation, which went down from 4.7% YoY in July to 4.3% in August, running in line with market expectations. As regards the core inflation, noteworthy is a stronger YoY growth in the prices of services excluding accommodation, which indicates that inflationary pressures in the US economy are still relatively strong. Data on industrial production was also released last week. It showed that its monthly growth rate decreased from 0.7% in July to 0.4% in August, standing above the market consensus (0.1%). Industrial production was pushed down by lower production growth in manufacturing and utilities, while higher production growth in mining had the opposite effect. At the same time, the capacity utilization rose to 79.7% in August vs. 79.5% in July. Data on retail sales was also released last week. It showed that its monthly nominal growth rate increased from 0.2% in July to 0.6% in August, running markedly above the market expectations (0.2%). Monthly sales growth excluding cars went down from 0.7% in July to 0.6% in August, also running above the consensus (0.4%). Retail sales growth was broad-based, and was seen in most categories, including “fuels” and “electronic equipment”, where it was particularly strong. To sum up, the retail sales data for the last couple of months shows that consumption demand in the US remains strong. Last week also saw the release of the preliminary University of Michigan index, which dropped from 69.5 pts in August to 67.7 pts in September, running below market expectations (69.2 pts). The index was driven down by a lower current situation sub-index, while a slightly higher expectations sub-index had the opposite impact. 1Y inflation expectations median published together with the University of Michigan index also went down, from 3.5% YoY in August to 3.1% in September, reaching the lowest value since March 2021. It indicates that US households’ inflation expectations are gradually weakening. In the light of last week’s data on US economy, we can see upside risk to our forecast that the annualized US GDP growth rate will slow down to 0.8% in Q3 vs. 2.1% in Q2.

 **CPI inflation in Poland fell to 10.1% YoY in August vs. 10.8% in July, running in line with the GUS flash estimate, and above the market consensus (10.0%) and our forecast (9.8%).** Inflation was driven down by a slower price growth in the “food and non-alcoholic beverages” (12.7% YoY in August vs. 15.6% in July) and “energy” (13.9% vs. 16.8%) categories combined with a decline in core inflation, which fell according to our expectations from 10.6% YoY in July to 10.1% YoY in August, indicating that inflationary pressures are gradually weakening (see MACROPulse of 15/09/2023). A stronger growth in the prices of fuels (-6.1% YoY in August vs. -15.5% in July) had the opposite impact on inflation. Last week’s data is consistent with our forecast of inflation falling down below 10% in September, and continuing to fall until it reaches 6.3% YoY in December 2023. We believe that the gradual inflation drop will be supported by a slower growth in the prices of food, non-alcoholic beverages and energy and by lower core inflation. Consequently, we forecast inflation in 2023 to go down from 14.3% YoY in 2022 to 11.6% in 2023, and although last week’s significant depreciation of the PLN carries some risk to our short-term

inflation forecast, its impact on inflation in the next couple of quarters will not be significant. We are still of the opinion that rapidly falling inflation in the months to come will cause the MPC to introduce further interest rate cuts. We believe the MPC will cut the interest rates twice more in 2023 (in October and November, each time by 50bp; see MACROmap of 11/09/2023), leaving the NBP reference rate at 5.00%.

Poland's current account balance fell to EUR 566m in July vs. EUR 2,431m in June, running well below market expectations (EUR 1,200m) and above our forecast (EUR -120m). Thus, July was the seventh month in a row with Poland reporting a current account surplus. The decline in the current account balance was




accounted for by lower balances on services, primary income and secondary income (down by EUR 709m, EUR 1049m and EUR 146m, respectively, vs. June) partially offset by higher balance on goods (by EUR 39m). At the same time, July saw declines in exports (1.3% YoY in July vs. 1.7% in June) and imports (-6.9% vs. -5.8%). According to the NBP release, the automotive sector remains an important source of export growth. In contrast, the decline in fuel and input prices had a downward effect on imports. Last week's data represents an upside risk to our forecast, which expects the cumulative current account balance for the last four quarters as a percentage of GDP to rise to 0.6% in Q3 from 0.1% in Q2.

Important data from China was released last week. Industrial production and retail sales figures turned out to be above market expectations, (4.5% YoY in August vs. 3.7% in July, with expectations at 3.9%; and 4.6% vs. 2.5%, with expectations at 3.0%, respectively), while urban investment figures came in close to market consensus (3.2% vs. 3.4%, with expectations at 3.3%). The data therefore shows the first signs of a recovery in economic growth in China. We believe that in the next few months the economic growth will accelerate due to the effects of the stimulus tools launched recently by the government (see MACROmap of 04/09/2023). We maintain our forecast that China's GDP will increase to 5.1% in 2023, up from 3.0% in 2022. This rate of growth will be consistent with the Chinese government's target for GDP growth rate of 'around 5%'.

What will be the consequences of loose fiscal policy in 2024?

Four weeks ago, the budget bill for 2024 was presented. The assumed amount of revenues for the state budget is PLN 683.6bn, and expenditures have been set at PLN 848.3bn. Thus, the planned deficit of the state budget for 2024 amounts to PLN 164,8bn. Below we analyse the factors affecting the cost of financing borrowing needs in 2024.




Source: MinFin, Credit Agricole

The gross borrowing needs of the state budget are the amount that is needed to finance the state budget deficit and the budget of European funds, the state budget's outgoings (including repayment of loans) and the redemption of bonds issued in previous years that mature in a given year. According to the budget bill, the gross borrowing needs of the state budget will

amount to PLN 420.6bn in 2024. As a proportion of GDP, they will amount to 11.2% and will be the highest since 2010.

At the same time, one should remember that the borrowing needs of the general government sector are not limited to the borrowing needs of the state budget (the so-called central budget) discussed above. In addition, it is also necessary to provide financing for local government units and financial obligations incurred via funds at the Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK) included in this sector. These include the National Road Fund, the COVID-19 Response Fund, the Aid Fund and the Armed Forces Support Fund, among others. The specific borrowing needs of these entities have not yet been made public. However, they can be estimated based on the change in the difference between the government institutions and local government units' debt and the state public debt. According to the budget bill submitted to the Sejm, the debt of other institutions included in the general government sector will increase by PLN 71.3bn between 2023 and 2024. This is the approximate value of the so-called net borrowing needs, i.e. gross borrowing needs after excluding the redemption of bonds maturing in 2024. According to information published by BGK, PLN 1.3bn worth of bonds issued by this institution will mature in 2024. On the other hand, on the basis of the Long-Term Financial Forecast for local government units (dated March 2023), one can assume that bond redemptions in this sector will amount to PLN 10.0bn. So the gross borrowing needs of units outside the central budget will be PLN 82.6bn in 2024. Thus, we estimate that the total net borrowing needs of the general government sector (central budget, local government units and BGK funds) will be PLN 296.7bn (7.9% of GDP) in 2024, with gross borrowing needs equal to PLN 491.9bn (13.1% of GDP). The scale of borrowing needs in 2024 will therefore be significant, which will have an upward effect on Polish bond yields.




In addition to analysing the impact of increased debt supply on the development of bond yields, the question of the development of demand for debt instruments issued by public sector entities is also crucial. In assessing the ability to finance government and local government borrowing needs, it is important to look at net borrowing needs. We

assume, that debt maturing in 2024 will simply be rolled over. We believe that domestic banks will be an important buyer of government-issued bonds. The excess liquidity of the banking sector, in simple terms defined as the excess of deposits of households and non-financial firms over loans granted to them, will increase in our view by about PLN 89bn in 2024 compared to 2023. Due to the design of the bank tax (no tax on bonds), a large part of these funds will be used to purchase government debt, in our opinion. However, one should bear in mind that, with the recovery in economic growth (and credit growth) and slower deposit growth (hampered by falling interest rates) that we expect, liquidity in the banking sector will increase in 2024 on a much smaller scale than in 2023 (PLN 150bn), which will be a limiting factor for demand for government bonds. The second source of financing borrowing needs may be available funds (not yet earmarked for financing these needs) accumulated in budget accounts. We estimate that the government's liquidity cushion is about PLN 15bn. Taking these two sources of financing into account, it will be necessary to issue PLN 193bn (5.1% of GDP) of bonds denominated in PLN or foreign currencies to finance the remaining net borrowing needs of the general government sector. The government's issue of bonds could be financed by funds placed so far by banks in NBP money bills (about PLN 200bn). However, we believe that the potential for such a transfer of funds is limited due to significant interest rate risk (NBP money bills are 7 days deposits, while bonds usually have maturities of several years). As a result, the government could opt to issue treasury bills with short maturities (less than a year) to increase the attractiveness of such securities compared with NBP money bills. Part of the necessary financing of the government's borrowing needs could alternatively be provided by borrowing abroad, which would reduce the necessary scale of bond issues. Such a loan of tens of billions of PLN, for example, was taken out in Korea in 2023 to finance arms purchases from that country. Nevertheless, it is difficult to forecast *ex ante* the possible actions of the government in 2024 to provide alternatives to debt issues to finance borrowing needs.

At the same time, it is worth noting that the budget bill and the estimates quoted above do not take into account certain expenditures, the likelihood of materialization of which in 2024 is not negligible, in our view. Thus, the actual borrowing needs of the state budget are likely to be significantly higher than the amount assumed in the bill. Indeed, the current bill does not provide for the extension of the reduced VAT rate on food or the continuation of the energy price shield measures. At present, it is difficult to assess whether and to what extent these measures will materialise, and thus to what extent they will contribute to an increase in borrowing needs relative to the figures presented in the budget. In this respect, much will also depend on the outcome of the parliamentary elections and the direction of economic policy in the coming quarters. Due to the ongoing EU-Poland dispute, further delays in the launch of the National Recovery Plan are also another risk factor in terms of financing Poland's borrowing needs. In an extreme case, it will be necessary to find alternative funding to the grants from this programme or to abandon the investment programmes that were to be funded under it.

The factors outlined above signal that there may be problems in 2024 in financing the government's borrowing needs, which will give rise to the need to reduce some public spending. Part of the financing


may be obtained from foreign investors, although the level is difficult to predict. It should also be borne in mind that the budget bill for 2024 already assumes a positive balance on the issuance and redemption of PLN 37bn worth of government bonds issued on international financial markets – almost three times the estimated value for 2023.



Source: MinFin, Credit Agricole * MinFin forecast

The budget bill assumes a general government deficit of 4.5% of GDP in 2024. Until 2023, the so-called general exit clause was in force, i.e. EU fiscal rules were effectively suspended and exceeding the 3% of GDP limit for the general government deficit did not generate adverse consequences. In 2024, the fiscal rules are likely to be reinstated, which raises the risk of Poland being subject to the so-called excessive deficit procedure. The materialisation of such a risk would have the effect of worsening Poland's creditworthiness. For example, at the beginning of September, Moody's noted that the significant deficit assumed in the 2024 draft budget would contribute to an increase in public debt and negatively affect Poland's credit profile. Poland's being covered with the excessive deficit procedure or a change in the outlook for Poland's rating to negative would be further factors (after a significant increase in the supply of debt and an increase in foreign investor involvement) leading to increased volatility of the PLN in 2024.


Spread between 10-year bonds and 10-year IRS (so called asset swap, pp.)



Source: Refinitiv, Credit Agricole

Recently, we have seen a normalisation of the yield curve in Poland (i.e. it is regaining a positive slope). In other words, short-maturity bond yields are declining relatively to bond yields at the long end of the curve in response to the expected easing of monetary policy. Significant borrowing needs and an increase in debt issuance in 2024 will act to further increase its slope by increasing yields on long-maturity bonds. At the same time, we will see a further increase in the spread between bonds and IRS rates at the long end of the curve, i.e. the so-called asset swap will increase (see chart).

EURPLN exchange rate remains in an upward trend




Last week, the EURPLN rate increased to 4.6382 (the PLN weakened by 0.6%). Throughout last week, the EURPLN exchange rate was in a mild upward trend, continuing the tendency initiated by the surprising scale of the interest rate cut made by the MPC two weeks ago (see MACROmap of 11/09/2023). On Wednesday, a statement was made by the PFR President P. Borys, who suggested that the government has the instruments to effectively stabilise the exchange rate. The statement was perceived by the market as an increase in the risk of the government selling foreign currencies on the market, which led to a strengthening of the PLN.

From the point of view of the EURUSD exchange rate, the key factor was the ECB's decision, surprising some investors, to raise interest rates in the Eurozone, which coincided with better-than-expected US retail sales data. The sum effect of these two events was a weakening of the EUR against the USD.

This week, the key for the PLN will be the publication of domestic retail sales data scheduled for Thursday, which may turn out to be slightly positive for the PLN. We believe that the remaining publications from the Polish and global economies scheduled for this week will be neutral for the Polish currency. Friday's update of Poland's rating by Moody's is likely to be announced after European markets close, thus its impact on the PLN will not materialise until next week.

Domestic retail sales data slightly positive for IRS rates



Last week, 2-year IRS rates increased to 4.42 (up by 9bp), 5-year rates to 4.29 (up by 13bp) and 10-year ones to 4.67 (up by 10bp). Last week saw a slight increase in IRS rates across the curve, which was largely a correction after their strong decline two weeks ago in reaction to the surprising scale of interest rate cut by the MPC (see MACROmap of 11/09/2023). A slight increase in IRS rates was also influenced by rising bond yields in the core markets (Germany, USA).

This week, the publication of national retail sales data scheduled for Thursday may contribute to a slight increase in IRS rates. Other data releases from the Polish and global economies scheduled for this week will be neutral for the curve in our opinion. Friday's update of Poland's rating by Moody's is likely to be announced after European markets close, thus its impact on the IRS rates will not materialise until next week.

Forecasts of the monthly macroeconomic indicators

Main monthly macroeconomic indicators in Poland														
Indicator	Aug-22	Sep-22	Oct-22	Nov-22	Dec-22	Jan-23	Feb-23	Mar-23	Apr-23	May-23	Jun-23	Jul-23	Aug-23	Sep-23
NBP reference rate (%)	6,50	6,75	6,75	6,75	6,75	6,75	6,75	6,75	6,75	6,75	6,75	6,75	6,75	6,00
EURPLN*	4,72	4,85	4,71	4,67	4,69	4,71	4,70	4,68	4,59	4,53	4,43	4,40	4,47	4,65
USDPLN*	4,70	4,95	4,77	4,48	4,38	4,33	4,45	4,31	4,16	4,23	4,06	4,00	4,12	4,27
CHFPLN*	4,80	5,01	4,76	4,74	4,72	4,70	4,72	4,71	4,66	4,64	4,52	4,59	4,66	4,79
CPI inflation (% YoY)	16,1	17,2	17,9	17,5	16,6	16,6	18,4	16,1	14,7	13,0	11,5	10,8	10,1	
Core inflation (% YoY)	9,9	10,7	11,0	11,4	11,5	11,7	12,0	12,3	12,2	11,5	11,1	10,6	10,1	
Industrial production (% YoY)	10,9	9,8	6,6	4,4	0,9	1,8	-1,0	-3,1	-6,0	-2,8	-1,1	-2,7	-1,7	
PPI inflation (% YoY)	25,5	24,6	23,1	21,1	20,5	20,1	18,2	10,3	6,2	2,8	0,3	-1,7	-3,2	
Retail sales (% YoY)	21,5	21,9	18,3	18,4	15,5	15,1	10,8	4,8	3,4	1,8	2,1	2,1	2,1	
Corporate sector wages (% YoY)	12,7	14,5	13,0	13,9	10,3	13,5	13,6	12,6	12,1	12,2	11,9	10,4	12,4	
Employment (% YoY)	2,4	2,3	2,4	2,3	2,2	1,1	0,8	0,5	0,4	0,4	0,2	0,1	0,1	
Unemployment rate* (%)	5,2	5,1	5,1	5,1	5,2	5,5	5,5	5,4	5,2	5,1	5,0	5,0	5,0	
Current account (M EUR)	-2847	-2208	-439	283	-2635	2381	1738	1355	529	1479	2431	566		
Exports (% YoY EUR)	28,1	26,5	23,2	24,2	10,6	15,7	14,7	18,1	2,6	3,3	1,7	1,3		
Imports (% YoY EUR)	29,6	31,4	24,1	18,3	11,3	7,4	3,9	-1,4	-8,9	-6,3	-5,8	-8,9		

*end of period

Forecasts of the quarterly macroeconomic indicators

Main macroeconomic indicators in Poland												
Indicator	2022				2023				2022	2023	2024	
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4				
Gross Domestic Product (% YoY)	8,8	6,1	3,9	2,3	-0,3	-0,6	0,5	1,9	5,1	0,5	2,8	
Private consumption (% YoY)	6,8	6,7	1,1	-1,1	-2,0	-2,7	0,2	2,3	3,3	-0,5	3,0	
Gross fixed capital formation (% YoY)	5,4	7,1	2,5	5,4	5,5	7,9	6,6	6,1	5,0	6,5	2,7	
Export - constant prices (% YoY)	5,6	6,4	9,0	3,9	3,2	-2,7	1,1	3,7	6,2	1,3	3,8	
Import - constant prices (% YoY)	8,7	8,2	7,7	0,7	-4,6	-8,1	-3,0	4,3	6,2	-2,6	4,3	
GDP growth contributions	Private consumption (pp)	4,0	3,8	0,6	-0,5	-1,0	-1,5	0,1	1,1	1,8	-0,3	1,7
	Investments (pp)	0,7	1,1	0,4	1,2	0,6	1,2	1,0	1,3	0,9	1,1	0,4
	Net exports (pp)	-1,4	-0,7	0,8	1,7	4,3	3,1	2,5	-0,3	0,2	2,4	-0,1
Current account (% of GDP)***	-2,5	-3,3	-3,4	-3,0	-1,2	0,1	0,6	0,8	-3,0	0,8	-1,0	
Unemployment rate (%)**	5,8	5,2	5,1	5,2	5,4	5,0	5,1	5,5	5,2	5,5	5,4	
Non-agricultural employment (% YoY)	2,3	0,6	-0,9	0,3	1,5	1,1	0,5	0,0	0,6	0,8	-1,0	
Wages in national economy (% YoY)	9,7	11,8	14,6	12,3	14,3	13,8	11,4	9,9	12,1	12,3	7,5	
CPI Inflation (% YoY)*	9,6	13,9	16,3	17,3	17,0	13,1	9,8	6,3	14,3	11,6	4,4	
Wibor 3M (%)**	4,77	7,05	7,21	7,02	6,89	6,90	5,38	5,13	7,02	5,13	4,13	
NBP reference rate (%)**	3,50	6,00	6,75	6,75	6,75	6,75	6,00	5,00	6,75	5,00	4,00	
EURPLN**	4,64	4,70	4,85	4,69	4,68	4,43	4,65	4,71	4,69	4,71	4,52	
USDPLN**	4,19	4,48	4,95	4,38	4,31	4,06	4,27	4,28	4,38	4,28	4,30	

* quarterly average

** end of period

***cumulative for the last 4 quarters

Calendar

TIME	COUNTRY	INDICATOR	PERIOD	PREV. VALUE	FORECAST*	
					CA	CONSENSUS**
Monday 09/18/2023						
14:00	Poland	Core inflation (% YoY)	Aug	10,6	10,1	10,0
Tuesday 09/19/2023						
10:00	Eurozone	Current account (bn EUR)	Jul	35,8		
11:00	Eurozone	HICP (% YoY)	Aug	5,3	5,3	5,3
14:30	USA	Building permits (k)	Aug	1443	1430	1440
14:30	USA	Housing starts (k MoM)	Aug	1452	1430	1440
Wednesday 09/20/2023						
10:00	Poland	Corporate sector wages (% YoY)	Aug	10,4	12,4	11,8
10:00	Poland	Employment (% YoY)	Aug	0,1	0,1	0,1
10:00	Poland	Industrial production (% YoY)	Aug	-2,7	-1,7	-1,7
10:00	Poland	PPI (% YoY)	Aug	-1,7	-3,2	-2,6
20:00	USA	FOMC meeting (%)	Sep	5,50	5,50	5,50
Thursday 09/21/2023						
9:30	Switzerland	SNB rate decision (%)	Q3	1,75		
10:00	Poland	Retail sales - current prices (% YoY)	Aug	2,1	2,1	1,8
10:00	Poland	Retail sales - constant prices (% YoY)	Aug	-4,0	-4,2	-3,9
13:00	UK	BOE rate decision (%)	Sep	5,25		5,50
14:30	USA	Philadelphia Fed Index (pts)	Sep	12,0		-1,0
16:00	USA	Existing home sales (M MoM)	Aug	4,07	4,09	4,10
16:00	Eurozone	Consumer Confidence Index (pts)	Sep	-16,0		-16,5
Friday 09/22/2023						
9:30	Germany	Flash Manufacturing PMI (pts)	Sep	39,1		39,5
10:00	Eurozone	Flash Services PMI (pts)	Sep	47,9		47,5
10:00	Eurozone	Flash Manufacturing PMI (pts)	Sep	43,5		44,0
10:00	Eurozone	Flash Composite PMI (pts)	Sep	46,7		46,3
14:00	Poland	M3 money supply (% YoY)	Aug	8,0	7,3	7,4
15:45	USA	Flash Manufacturing PMI (pts)	Sep	47,9		47,9

*The forecasts of macroeconomic indicators for Poland were prepared by Credit Agricole Bank Polska S.A. The forecasts of foreign indicators were prepared by Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank

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